Discriminators who have limited tolerance for helping dissimilar others are necessary for the evolution of costly cooperation in a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma. Existing research reports that trust in

How can species evolve a cooperative network to keep the environment suitable for life?

This is a model of innovation implementation inside an organization. It characterizes an innovation as a set of distributed and technically interdependent tasks performed by a number of different and socially interconnected frontline workers.

Continuing on from the Adder model, this adaptation explores how rationality, learning and uncertainty influence the exploration of complex landscapes representing technological evolution.

The original Ache model is used to explore different distributions of resources on the landscape and it’s effect on optimal strategies of the camps on hunting and camp movement.

Captures interplay between fixed ethnic markers and culturally evolved tags in the evolution of cooperation and ethnocentrism. Agents evolve cultural tags, behavioural game strategies and in-group definitions. Ethnic markers are fixed.

This model simulates the spread of anti-vaccine sentiments in cyber and physical space and how it creates emergence of clusters of anti-vacciners, which eventually lead to higher probablity of disease outbreaks.

This is an original model of (sub)culture diffusion.
It features a set of agents (dubbed “partygoers”) organized initially in clusters, having properties such as age and a chromosome of opinions about 6 different topics. The partygoers interact with a set of cultures (also having a set of opinions subsuming those of its members), in the sense of refractory or unhappy members of each setting about to find a new culture and trading information encoded in the genetic string (originally encoded as -1, 0, and 1, resp. a negative, neutral, and positive opinion about each of the 6 traits/aspects, e.g. the use of recreational drugs). There are 5 subcultures that both influence (through the aforementioned genetic operations of mutation and recombination of chromosomes simulating exchange of opinions) and are influenced by its members (since a group is a weighted average of the opinions and actions of its constituents). The objective of this feedback loop is to investigate under which conditions certain subculture sizes emerge, but the model is open to many other kinds of explorations as well.

This study employs a hierarchical cross-departmental ABM to explore the question: How and to what extent are the land use policies enforced when assessed against the real-world land use pattern? Specifically, two sub-questions are of interest: How can real-world policy interactions be abstracted into the behavior across hierarchical governmental departments in the model? How can the level of enforcement for each land use policy be quantified under these interactions? We build three hierarchical agents—the central level, the local level that incorporates three departments, and the village collective level—with simplified but plausible processes of land use change, with levels of enforcement of different land use policies as key parameters. We calibrate the model using a genetic algorithm to determine those parameters and answer our research question. We further applied the model to simulate potential land use changes and investigate the implications of different policy options. The results are expected to provide insights into the intricate relationships shaping land use processes, contributing to evidence-based decision-making in urban planning and sustainable land use management.

In his 2003 book, Historical Dynamics (ch. 4), Turchin describes and briefly analyzes a spatial ABM of his metaethnic frontier theory, which is essentially a formalization of a theory by Ibn Khaldun in the 14th century. In the model, polities compete with neighboring polities and can absorb them into an empire. Groups possess “asabiya”, a measure of social solidarity and a sense of shared purpose. Regions that share borders with other groups will have increased asabiya do to salient us vs. them competition. High asabiya enhances the ability to grow, work together, and hence wage war on neighboring groups and assimilate them into an empire. The larger the frontier, the higher the empire’s asabiya.
As an empire expands, (1) increased access to resources drives further growth; (2) internal conflict decreases asabiya among those who live far from the frontier; and (3) expanded size of the frontier decreases ability to wage war along all frontiers. When an empire’s asabiya decreases too much, it collapses.  Another group with more compelling asabiya eventually helps establish a new empire.