This spatially explicit agent-based model addresses how effective foraging radius (r_e) affects the effective size–and thus the equilibrium cultural diversity–of a structured population composed of central-place foraging groups.

A model of innovation diffusion in a structured population with two groups who are averse to adopting a produce popular with the outgroup.

This model examines the potential impact of market collapse on the economy and demography of fishing households in the Logone Floodplain, Cameroon.

This model simulates the form and function of an idealised estuary with associated barrier-spit complex on the north east coast of New Zealand’s North Island (from Bream Bay to central Bay of Plenty) during the years 2010 - 2050 CE. It combines variables from social, ecological and geomorphic systems to simulate potential directions of change in shallow coastal systems in response to external forcing from land use, climate, pollution, population density, demographics, values and beliefs. The estuary is over 1000Ha, making it a large estuary according to Hume et al. (2007) - there are 12 large estuaries in the Auckland region alone (Suyadi et al., 2019). The model was developed as part of Andrew Allison’s PhD Thesis in Geography from the School of Environment and Institute of Marine Science, University of Auckland, New Zealand. The model setup allows for alteration of geomorphic, ecological and social variables to suit the specific conditions found in various estuaries along the north east coast of New Zealand’s North Island.
This model is not a predictive or forecasting model. It is designed to investigate potential directions of change in complex shallow coastal systems. This model must not be used for any purpose other than as a heuristic to facilitate researcher and stakeholder learning and for developing system understanding (as per Allison et al., 2018).

Simulations based on the Axelrod model and extensions to inspect the volatility of the features over time (AXELROD MODEL & Agreement threshold & two model variations based on the Social identity approach)
The Axelrod model is used to predict the number of changes per feature in comparison to the datasets and is used to compare different model variations and their performance.

Input: Real data

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The goal of the paper is to propose an abstract but formalised model of how Schwartz higher order values may influence individual decisions on sharing an individual effort among alternative economic activities. Subsequently, individual decisions are aggregated into the total (collective) economic output, taking into account interactions between the agents. In particular, we explore the relationship between individual higher order values: Self–Enhancement, Self–Transcendence, Openness to Change, and Conservation – measured according to Schwartz’s universal human values theory – and individual and collective economic performance, by means of a theoretical agent based model. Furthermore, based on empirical observations, Openness to Change (measured by the population average in the case of collective output) is positively associated with individual and collective output. These relations are negative for Conservation. Self-Enhancement is positively associated with individual output but negatively with collective output. In case of Self–Transcendence, this effect is opposite. The model provides the potential explanations, in terms of individual and population differences in: propensity for management, willingness to change, and skills (measured by an educational level) for the empirically observed relations between Schwartz higher order values and individual and collective output. We directly calibrate the micro–level of the model using data from the ninth round of the European Social Survey (ESS9) and present the results of numerical simulations.

The model explores the impact of public disclosure on tax compliance among diverse agents, including individual taxpayers and a tax authority. It incorporates heterogeneous preferences and income endowments among taxpayers, captured through a utility function that considers psychic costs subtracted from expected pecuniary utility. These costs include moral, reciprocity, and stigma costs associated with norm violations, leading to variations in taxpayers’ risk attitudes and related parameters. The tax authority’s attributes, such as the frequency of random audits, penalty rate, and the choice between partial or full disclosure, remain fixed throughout the simulation. Income endowments and preference parameters are randomly assigned to taxpayers at the outset.

Taxpayers maximize their expected utility by reporting income, taking into account tax, penalty, and audit rates. They make annual decisions based on their own and their peers’ behaviors from the previous year. Taxpayers indirectly interact at the societal level through public disclosure conducted by the tax authority, exchanging tax information among peers. Each period in the simulation collects data on total reported income, average compliance rates per income group, distribution of compliance rates, counts of compliers, full evaders, partial evaders, and the numbers of taxpayers experiencing guilt and anger. The model evaluates whether public disclosure positively or negatively impacts compliance rates and quantifies this impact based on aggregated individual reporting behaviors.

The “Descriptive Norm and Fraud Dynamics” model demonstrates how fraudulent behavior can either proliferate or be contained within non-hierarchical organizations, such as peer networks, through social influence taking the form of a descriptive norm. This model expands on the fraud triangle theory, which posits that an individual must concurrently possess a financial motive, perceive an opportunity, and hold a pro-fraud attitude to engage in fraudulent activities (red agent). In the absence of any of these elements, the individual will act honestly (green agent).

The model explores variations in a descriptive norm mechanism, ranging from local distorted knowledge to global perfect knowledge. In the case of local distorted knowledge, agents primarily rely on information from their first-degree colleagues. This knowledge is often distorted because agents are slow to update their empirical expectations, which are only partially revised after one-to-one interactions. On the other end of the spectrum, local perfect knowledge is achieved by incorporating a secondary source of information into the agents’ decision-making process. Here, accurate information provided by an observer is used to update empirical expectations.

The model shows that the same variation of the descriptive norm mechanism could lead to varying aggregate fraud levels across different fraud categories. Two empirically measured norm sensitivity distributions associated with different fraud categories can be selected into the model to see the different aggregate outcomes.

The MeReDiem model aims to simulate the effect of socio-agricultural practices of farmers and pastors on the food sustainability and soil fertility of a serrer village, in Senegal. The model is a central part of a companion modeling and exploration approach, described in a paper, currently under review)

The village population is composed of families (kitchens). Kitchens cultivate their land parcels to feed their members, aiming for food security at the family level. On a global level , the village tries to preserve the community fallow land as long as possible.

Kitchens sizes vary depending on the kitchens food production, births and migration when food is insufficient.
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The Non-Deterministic model of affordable housing Negotiations (NoD-Neg) is designed for generating hypotheses about the possible outcomes of negotiating affordable housing obligations in new developments in England. By outcomes we mean, the probabilities of failing the negotiation and/or the different possibilities of agreement.
The model focuses on two negotiations which are key in the provision of affordable housing. The first is between a developer (DEV) who is submitting a planning application for approval and the relevant Local Planning Authority (LPA) who is responsible for reviewing the application and enforcing the affordable housing obligations. The second negotiation is between the developer and a Registered Social Landlord (RSL) who buys the affordable units from the developer and rents them out. They can negotiate the price of selling the affordable units to the RSL.
The model runs the two negotiations on the same development project several times to enable agents representing stakeholders to apply different negotiation tactics (different agendas and concession-making tactics), hence, explore the different possibilities of outcomes.
The model produces three types of outputs: (i) histograms showing the distribution of the negotiation outcomes in all the simulation runs and the probability of each outcome; (ii) a data file with the exact values shown in the histograms; and (iii) a conversation log detailing the exchange of messages between agents in each simulation run.