Computational Model Library

Displaying 10 of 314 results for "Shu-Heng Chen" clear search

EthnoCultural Tag model (ECT)

Bruce Edmonds David Hales | Published Friday, October 16, 2015 | Last modified Wednesday, May 09, 2018

Captures interplay between fixed ethnic markers and culturally evolved tags in the evolution of cooperation and ethnocentrism. Agents evolve cultural tags, behavioural game strategies and in-group definitions. Ethnic markers are fixed.

Inquisitiveness in ad hoc teams

Davide Secchi | Published Sunday, October 18, 2015 | Last modified Thursday, June 11, 2020

This model builds on inquisitiveness as a key individual disposition to expand the bounds of their rationality. It represents a system where teams are formed around problems and inquisitive agents integrate competencies to find ‘emergent’ solutions.

Social norms and the dominance of Low-doers

Antonio Franco | Published Wednesday, July 13, 2016 | Last modified Sunday, December 02, 2018

The code for the paper “Social norms and the dominance of Low-doers”

We propose an agent-based model where a fixed finite population of tagged agents play iteratively the Nash demand game in a regular lattice. The model extends the bargaining model by Axtell, Epstein and Young.

This is a simulation model of an intelligent agent that has the objective to learn sustainable management of a renewable resource, such as a fish stock.

Peer reviewed Evolution of Ecological Communities: Testing Constraint Closure

Steve Peck | Published Sunday, December 06, 2020 | Last modified Friday, April 16, 2021

Ecosystems are among the most complex structures studied. They comprise elements that seem both stable and contingent. The stability of these systems depends on interactions among their evolutionary history, including the accidents of organisms moving through the landscape and microhabitats of the earth, and the biotic and abiotic conditions in which they occur. When ecosystems are stable, how is that achieved? Here we look at ecosystem stability through a computer simulation model that suggests that it may depend on what constrains the system and how those constraints are structured. Specifically, if the constraints found in an ecological community form a closed loop, that allows particular kinds of feedback may give structure to the ecosystem processes for a period of time. In this simulation model, we look at how evolutionary forces act in such a way these closed constraint loops may form. This may explain some kinds of ecosystem stability. This work will also be valuable to ecological theorists in understanding general ideas of stability in such systems.

Leviathan model and its approximation

Thibaut Roubin Guillaume Deffuant | Published Thursday, September 17, 2020 | Last modified Monday, September 06, 2021

The model is based on the influence function of the Leviathan model (Deffuant, Carletti, Huet 2013 and Huet and Deffuant 2017). We aim at better explaining some patterns generated by this model, using a derived mathematical approximation of the evolution of the opinions averaged.

We consider agents having an opinion/esteem about each other and about themselves. During dyadic meetings, agents change their respective opinion about each other, and possibly about other agents they gossip about, with a noisy perception of the opinions of their interlocutor. Highly valued agents are more influential in such encounters.

We show that the inequality of reputations among agents have a negative effect on the opinions about the agents of low status.The mathematical analysis of the opinion dynamic shows that the lower the status of the agent, the more detrimental the interactions are for the opinions about this agent, especially when gossip is activated, while the interactions always tend to increase the opinions about agents of high status.

This model is based on the Narragansett Bay, RI recreational fishery. The two types of agents are piscivorous fish and fishers (shore and boat fishers are separate “breeds”). Each time step represents one week. Open season is weeks 1-26, assuming fishing occurs during half the year. At each weekly time step, fish agents grow, reproduce, and die. Fisher agents decide whether or not to fish based on their current satisfaction level, and those that do go fishing attempt to catch a fish. If they are successful, they decide whether to keep or release the fish. In our publication, this model was linked to an Ecopath with Ecosim food web model where the commercial harvest of forage fish affected the biomass of piscivorous fish - which then became the starting number of piscivorous fish for this ABM. The number of fish caught in a season of this ABM was converted to a fishing pressure and input back into the food web model.

The HERB model simulates the retrofit behavior of homeowners in a neighborhood. The model initially parameterizes a neighborhood and households with technical factors such as energy standard, the availability of subsidies, and neighbors’ retrofit activity. Then, these factors are translated into psychological variables such as perceived comfort gain, worry about affording the retrofit, and perceiving the current energy standard of the home as wasteful. These psychological variables moderate the transition between four different stages of deciding to retrofit, as suggested by a behavioral model specific to household energy retrofitting identified based on a large population survey in Norway. The transition between all stages eventually leads to retrofitting, which affects both the household’s technical factors and friends and neighbors, bringing the model “full circle”. The model assumes that the energy standard of the buildings deteriorates over time, forcing households to retrofit regularly to maintain a certain energy standard.

Because experiment datafiles are about 15GB, they are available at https://doi.org/10.18710/XOSAMD

The conditional defector strategy can violate the most crucial supporting mechanisms of cooperation.

Ahmed Ibrahim | Published Tuesday, June 07, 2022 | Last modified Sunday, September 28, 2025

Cooperation is essential for all domains of life. Yet, ironically, it is intrinsically vulnerable to exploitation by cheats. Hence, an explanatory necessity spurs many evolutionary biologists to search for mechanisms that could support cooperation. In general, cooperation can emerge and be maintained when cooperators are sufficiently interacting with themselves. This communication provides a kind of assortment and reciprocity. The most crucial and common mechanisms to achieve that task are kin selection, spatial structure, and enforcement (punishment). Here, we used agent-based simulation models to investigate these pivotal mechanisms against conditional defector strategies. We concluded that the latter could easily violate the former and take over the population. This surprising outcome may urge us to rethink the evolution of cooperation, as it illustrates that maintaining cooperation may be more difficult than previously thought. Moreover, empirical applications may support these theoretical findings, such as invading the cooperator population of pathogens by genetically engineered conditional defectors, which could be a potential therapy for many incurable diseases.

Displaying 10 of 314 results for "Shu-Heng Chen" clear search

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