Our model allows simulating repeated conservation auctions in low-income countries. It is designed to assess policy-making by exploring the extent to which non-targeted repeated auctions can provide biodiversity conservation cost-effectively, while alleviating poverty. Targeting landholders in order to integrate both goals is claimed to be overambitious and underachieving because of the trade-offs they imply. The simulations offer insight on the possible outcomes that can derive from implementing conservation auctions in low-income countries, where landholders are likely to be risk averse and to face uncertainty.

This model is designed to investigate the impact of alternative policy approaches and changing land tenure dynamics on farmer adoption of conservation practices intended to increase the water quality.

CEDSS is an agent-based model of domestic energy demand at the level of a small community.

NetCommons simulates a social dilemma process in case of step-level public goods. Is possible to generate (or load from DL format) any different networks, to change initial parameters, to replicate a number of experimental situations, and to obtain a event history database in CSV format with information about the context of each agents’ decision, the individual behavior and the aggregate outcomes.

How can a strictly egalitarian social system give way to a stratified society if all of its members punish each other for any type of selfish behavior? This model examines the role of prestige bias in constant and variable environments on the development of hierarchies of wealth.

The model represents a team intended at designing a methodology for Institutional Planning. Included in ICAART’14 to exemplify how emotions can be identified in SocLab; and in ESSA’14 to show the Efficiency of Organizational Withdrawal vs Commitment.

The model represents an archetypical fishery in a co-evolutionary social-ecological environment, capturing different dimensions of trust between fishers and fish buyers for the establishment and persistence of self-governance arrangements.

This model simulates a forest ecosystem affected by human logging. We explore different kind of approaches and their possible consequences for the ecosystem. Loggers can either be responsible or irresponsible, they will either take care to cut trees or not. In turn their actions will have consequences on the quality of the soil, the atmosphere as well as their profit made from logging. In this model we see that even careful management cannot prevent the degradation of the forest ecosystem.

Indirect reciprocity can be evolved by the shared information among the people of small subgroups in the population.

This model simulates how collective self-organisation among individuals that manage irrigation resource collectively.